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A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON FRAND ROYALTIES: UNWIRED PLANET V. HUAWEI 
  
Draft for Comment: 13 Apr 2017 
 
Jorge L. Contreras1 
  
            In Unwired Planet v. Huawei,2 Mister Justice Colin Birss of the UK High Court of Justice 
(Patents) has issued a detailed and illuminating opinion regarding the assessment of royalties on 
standards-essential patents (SEPs) that are subject to FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory) licensing commitments.  Among the important and potentially controversial 
rulings in the case are (1) there is but a single FRAND royalty rate applicable to any given set of 
SEPs and circumstances, (2) neither a breach of contract nor a competition claim for abuse of 
dominance will succeed unless a SEP holder’s offer is significantly above the true FRAND rate, 
(3) FRAND licenses for global market players are necessarily global licenses and should not be 
limited to a single jurisdiction, and (4) the “non-discrimination” (ND) prong of the FRAND 
commitment does not imply a “hard-edged” test in which a licensee may challenge the FRAND 
license that it has been granted on the basis that another similarly situated licensee has been 
granted a lower rate, so long as the difference does not distort competition between the two 
licensees. This case should prove important, particularly as courts around the world wrestle with 
the increasing assertion of SEPs by patent assertion entities (PAEs)3 and the transfer of SEPs 




 This case began in 2014 when Unwired Planet, a U.S.-based patent assertion entity, sued 
Google, Samsung and Huawei for infringement under six UK patents (corresponding actions 
were filed in Germany).  Unwired Planet claimed that five of the asserted patents, which it 
acquired from Ericsson in 2013 as part of a portfolio comprising approximately 2,000 patents,5 
were essential to the 2G, 3G and 4G wireless telecommunications standards developed under the 
auspices of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).  Because Ericsson 
participated in development of the standards at ETSI, any patents shown to be SEPs would 
necessarily be encumbered by Ericsson’s FRAND commitment to ETSI.  
  
                                                      
1 Associate Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. Please send comments, suggestions 
and corrections to jorge.contreras@law.utah.edu.  An earlier version of this paper appeared in the Patently-
O Blog on Apr. 10, 2017, https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/04/unwired-perspective-royalties.html. 
2 [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017). 
3 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Fabian Gaessler, Christian Helmers, and Brian Love Litigation of Standards-
Essential Patents in Europe: A Comparative Analysis, __ BERKELEY TECH. L.J. __ (2017, forthcoming) 
(describing SEP assertions in UK and Germany, noting high levels of assertion by NPEs); Jorge L. 
Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards Outsiders and Unencumbered Patents, 12(3) J. COMPETITION 
L. & ECON. 507 (2016) (describing high levels of SEP assertion in U.S. litigation). 
4 See, e.g., John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical Survivors, 26 HARV. J. L. 
& TECH. 545 (2013); Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F. Cotter, Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. 871 (2016). 
5 See Master Sale Agreement dated Jan. 10, 2013 between Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson and Cluster 
LLC, et al., available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1082506/000119312513012058/d466328dex102.htm .  See also 
Florian Mueller, Ericsson’s pseudo-sale of patents to Unwired Planet and the rampant problem of 
privateering, FOSS Patents, Apr. 21, 2015, available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2015/04/ericssons-
pseudo-sale-of-patents-to.html . 
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 The UK proceedings involved numerous stages, including five scheduled “technical 
trials” which would determine whether each of the asserted patents was valid, infringed and 
essential to the ETSI standards.  During these proceedings Google and Samsung settled with 
Unwired Planet and Ericsson (which receives a portion of the licensing and settlement revenue 
earned by Unwired Planet from the patents), leaving Huawei as the sole UK defendant.  By April 
2016 three of the technical trials had been completed, resulting in findings that two of the asserted 
patents were invalid and that two were both valid and essential to the standards.  These findings 
are currently under appeal. The parties then agreed to suspend further technical trials.  In October 
2016 a “non-technical” trial began regarding issues of competition law, FRAND, injunction and 
damages.  Hearings were concluded in December 2016, and the court’s opinion and judgment 
were issued on April 5, 2017. 
  
A.        The High Court’s Decision – Overview 
  
 The principal questions before the court in Unwired Planet were (1) the level of the 
FRAND royalty for Unwired Planet’s SEPs, (2) whether Unwired Planet abused a dominant 
position in violation of Section 102 of the Treaty for the Formation of the European Union 
(TFEU) by failing to adhere to the procedural requirements for FRAND negotiations outlined by 
the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE,6 and (3) whether an injunction should 
issue in the case.  In the below discussion. 
  
B.         FRAND Commitments – General Observations 
  
            Birss, J. begins with some general observations and background about the standard-setting 
process and FRAND commitments.  A few notable points emerge from this discussion. 
  
            1.         ETSI and French law.  FRAND commitments in standard-setting arise from the 
voluntary commitments made by participants in the standards-development process.  These 
commitments are largely the result of written policies adopted by standards-development 
organizations (SDOs).  There is considerable academic debate regarding the legal treatment of 
these commitments, and whether they can and should be enforceable as contractual commitments: 
not by the SDO, but by third party implementers of the SDO’s standards.7   
 
 Given this context, it is an inconvenient fact, at least to international commentators, that 
ETSI, one of the principal global SDOs, is chartered under French law, and that French legal 
principles govern its membership and policy documentation.8 In recent cases involving ETSI 
standards, several non-French courts, particularly in the U.S., have studiously avoided any deep 
engagement with French law in considering these questions.  The most notable instance of such 
evasion occurred in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc.,9 in which the trial judge concluded, on 
the basis of a single affidavit, that French law “requires the same general elements” as Wisconsin 
law, and made little effort to apply anything other than local law to the case.10    
  
                                                      
6 Case C-170/13, 16th July 2015 [2015] Bus LR 1261. 
7 See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 
2015 UTAH L. REV 479, 508-14 (2015) (discussing and questioning third party beneficiary theory as 
applied to contractual FRAND commitments). 
8 European Telecom. Standards Inst., ETSI Rules of Procedure, Sec. 12 – Law and Regulation (“This 
Policy shall be governed by the laws of France.”) 
9 886 F.Supp.2d 1061 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
10 Id. at 1083. 
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            To his credit, Birss, J. undertakes a thorough analysis of French statutory law as applied to 
ETSI’s FRAND commitments, thoughtfully probing the arguments of both parties’ 
experts.11  And while he concedes that, as a theoretical matter, “the enforceability of the 
FRAND undertaking in French law is not a clear cut question”,12 he adopts the pragmatic view 
that FRAND commitments should in any event be viewed as “public, irrevocable and 
enforceable” on grounds of public policy, if nothing else.13  
  
            2.         A Single FRAND Rate.  In an earlier case, Vringo v. ZTE14, Birss, J. considered the 
possibility that a SEP holder and a standard implementer could each make the other a FRAND 
licensing offer, resulting in two competing FRAND offers or a range of possible royalty rates that 
could qualify as FRAND.  In Unwired Planet, Birss, J. reconsiders this possibility, reasoning that 
it is far better to maintain, as a matter of law, that there is but a single royalty rate that qualifies as 
FRAND for any given set of SEPs and products.15  From a practical standpoint, this approach 
solves several problems, including how to evaluate the conduct of the parties from a competition 
law standpoint.  In rejecting the parties’ objections to this approach, he makes two additional 
observations.  First, if there is but a single precise value for the FRAND royalty, it is likely that 
parties, in private bilateral negotiations over SEP licenses, will agree on some royalty rate that 
differs from this precise value.  This likelihood does not, however, open up every negotiated 
agreement to a FRAND-based challenge, as the parties are free to agree on any royalty they wish, 
absent competition law considerations.16  
  
            I am not wholly convinced by this reasoning.  In essence, the court holds that while the 
FRAND rate is precise, the conditions under which it may be enforced are fuzzy.  This conclusion 
results in a number of additional logical hurdles, discussed below, with respect to the SEP 
holder’s initial offer to the implementer and how to assess the SEP holder’s compliance with 
competition law. An alternative approach that avoids these problems is the one developed by 
Judge James Robart in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. 17  There, the court determined a 
FRAND range for the SEPs covering each standard at issue in order to assess the SEP holder’s 
compliance with its FRAND commitment.  Then, in setting a final royalty, the court picked a 
specific rate within the allowable range.  This approach seems more in keeping with the parties’ 
intent during standard-setting, and creates a more definite framework for assessing the parties’ 
compliance with their FRAND commitments. 
  
            3.         FRAND means Worldwide. Unwired Planet offered Huawei a worldwide license 
under the asserted SEPs.  Huawei responded that it only wanted a license under Unwired Planet’s 
UK patents,18 and that Unwired Planet’s insistence on a worldwide license was unreasonable.  In 
evaluating the reasonableness of Unwired Planet’s worldwide license offer, Birss, J. first 
observed that “the vast majority” of SEP licenses in the industry, including all of the comparable 
licenses introduced at trial, were granted on a worldwide basis.19  He then observed that Unwired 
                                                      
11 Unwired Planet at ¶¶ 103-146. 
12 Unwired Planet at ¶146. 
13 Id.  See also Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note 7, at 486-90 (discussing inherently public nature of 
FRAND commitments) and Jorge L. Contreras, From Private Ordering to Public Law: The Legal 
Framework Governing Standards-Essential Patents, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 211 (2017). 
14 [2013] EWHC 1591 (Pat) and [2015] EWHC 214 (Pat.). 
15 Unwired Planet at ¶804(4). 
16 Unwired Planet at ¶155.  See also Part C, infra. 
17 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
18 Unwired Planet at ¶524. 
19 Unwired Planet at ¶534. 
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Planet’s patents were issued in forty-two countries, while Huawei’s operations extended to fifty-
one countries.20  In effect, both are global companies.  Against this backdrop, he concluded that 
“a licensor and licensee acting reasonably and on a willing basis would agree on a 
worldwide licence”.21  In contrast, he regards the possibility of country-by-country licensing as 
highly inefficient.22  The prospect of two large multinational companies agreeing to country-by-
country licensing, he concludes, would be “madness”,23 and that Huawei’s insistence on a UK-
only license is not FRAND.24 He likewise dismisses Huawei’s arguments that including unwanted 
patents from certain countries in its portfolio amounts to illegal tying in violation of competition 
law. 25    Accordingly, he rules that, in this case, a FRAND license is necessarily 
a worldwide license. 
  
            4.         FRAND Requires Granting a License, not Merely Offering FRAND Terms.  It has 
long been a point of debate whether a FRAND commitment requires a SEP holder to offer 
FRAND terms to a potential licensee, or actually to enter into a license on FRAND 
terms.26  Birss, J. answers this question in a novel manner.  Bearing in mind his earlier conclusion 
that there is only one FRAND rate under a given set of circumstances, if the SEP holder’s 
obligation were merely to make an offer at the FRAND rate, then the normal process of 
negotiation “would condemn patentees to always end up with negotiated rates below a 
FRAND rate”.27  Under this reasoning, it would seem that the SEP holder would be justified in 
making an initial offer above the FRAND rate, so that the final negotiated rate ended up being 
FRAND.  This approach seems a dangerous one, as SEP holders may not always negotiate a rate 
downward, particularly when they use a standard set of rates (which is advisable given the non-
discrimination commitment that also makes up part of a FRAND commitment). Thus, this 
leniency seems to support higher (and supra-FRAND) offers by SEP holders.  More sensible, I 
believe, is Judge Robart’s approach in Microsoft v. Motorola, in which FRAND represents 
a range of reasonable royalties into which the SEP holder’s initial offer must fall. 
  
C.         The FRAND Negotiation Process and Competition Law 
  
            1.         SEP Holder’s Offer.  In Huawei v. ZTE, the CJEU established a set of procedures 
that a SEP holder must comply with when negotiating a FRAND license in order to avoid a 
finding that it abused its dominant position under TFEU Section 102.  To do so, based on the 
rulings of the CJEU and lower courts in Germany and other EU countries, practitioners and 
commentators have assumed that in order to avoid a finding of abuse of dominance, a SEP holder 
must make an initial FRAND offer to a potential licensee.  However, under Birss, J.’s reasoning 
that there is only a single FRAND rate in a given transaction, requiring the SEP holder to offer 
this rate at the outset would not be reasonable.  Thus, Birss, J. concludes that it would not be an 
abuse of dominance under TFEU 102 or the CJEU’s holding in Huawei v. ZTE for a SEP holder 
to offer a rate that is different from the precise FRAND rate, so long as it is 
                                                      
20 Unwired Planet at ¶538. 
21 Unwired Planet at ¶543. 
22 Unwired Planet at ¶544. 
23 Unwired Planet at ¶543. 
24 Unwired Planet at ¶572. 
25 Unwired Planet at ¶¶545-572. 
26 See Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note 7, at 497-98 (discussing distinction between “process 
obligtations” and “content obligations”). 
27 Unwired Planet at ¶159. 
CONTRERAS UNWIRED PLANET Page 5 
not excessively so.28  That is, an abuse of dominance will not be found unless an offer “is so far 
above FRAND as to act to disrupt or prejudice the negotiations themselves”.29   
  
            2.         Hold-out.  Birss, J. also addresses the behavior of the potential licensee in these 
negotiations.  If the licensee engages in deliberate delay tactics or other unreasonable behavior to 
avoid entering into a license (and thus paying royalties), this is referred to as hold-out or reverse 
hold-up.  Birss, J. views the behavior of the potential licensee as relevant in determining whether, 
from a competition law standpoint, the SEP holder possesses a dominant position.30  Interestingly, 
however, Birss, J. reasons that evidence of implementer holdout is really only relevant before 
pricing discussions began.   “Once prices are discussed a delay may just be due to a licensor 
asking for too much money”.31   
  
D.        Non-Discrimination 
 
 The non-discrimination (ND) prong of the FRAND commitment is important, but has 
received far less attention from courts than other issues.  Birss, J. devotes substantial space to the 
non-discrimination arguments made by the parties, and develops some novel theories in doing so. 
  
            1.         Similarly-Situated Licensees.  There is general consensus (including among the 
experts in this case) that in order to comply with the non-discrimination prong of the FRAND 
commitment, a SEP holder must treat “similarly situated” licensees in a similar 
manner.32  Several commentators have understood this constraint to allow a SEP holder to charge 
different royalty rates to implementers based on their size or market share (often with the 
understanding that larger players are likely to sell more licensed products and thus pay higher 
levels of royalties).33  Birss, J., however, reasons that a FRAND royalty rate should be set based 
on the value of the licensed patents, not on the size of other characteristics of the 
licensee.34  Thus, “all licensees who need the same kind of licence will be charged the same 
kind of rate” (id.) and “[s]mall new entrants are entitled to pay a royalty based on the same 
benchmark as established large entities”.35  This attempt to level the playing field for new market 
entrants is a positive development, as this issue is currently being debated in other FRAND cases 
around the world. 
  
            2.         Hard-Edged Non-Discrimination.  But despite bolstering the non-discrimination 
commitment by eliminating size-based discrimination, Birss, J. then weakens it by holding that a 
licensee cannot challenge a license allegedly granted on FRAND terms if it later discovers that a 
similarly-situated implementer received a lower royalty rate unless the difference would “distort 
competition” between the two licensees.36  In reaching this conclusion, he rejects the notion that 
the ND prong of FRAND implies a “hard-edged” obligation that establishes a ceiling on the rate 
that a SEP holder may charge.  Birss, J. justifies this conclusion under a competition law 
                                                      
28 Unwired Planet at ¶153. 
29 Unwired Planet at ¶765. 
30 Unwired Planet at ¶806(12). 
31 Unwired Planet at ¶667. 
32 Unwired Planet at ¶485. 
33  See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855 (2011); Dennis W. Carlton and Allan L. Shampine, An Economic 
Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531 (2013). 
34 Unwired Planet at ¶175. 
35 Unwired Planet at ¶806(8). 
36 Unwired Planet at ¶501. 
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rationale, noting that a competition law violation would not occur without a competitive 
distortion.  This reasoning, however, seems to conflate two issues: the competition law effects of 
violating a FRAND commitment, and the private “contractual” meaning of the FRAND 
commitment itself.  I am uncertain whether the participants in an SDO would interpret the non-
discrimination prong of FRAND to allow discrimination between similarly situated 
licensees.  While a competition law violation might not arise absent some distortion to 
competition, I believe that the underlying contractual meaning of FRAND must impose a stricter 
definition of non-discrimination that would prevent all but the most inconsequential differences 
between similarly situated licensees. 
  
E.         FRAND Royalty Calculation Methodology 
  
            Perhaps the most significant aspect of Birss, J.’s opinion in Unwired Planet is his careful 
calculation of the FRAND royalty applicable to the parties’ transaction.  He offers two possible 
methods of calculating the FRAND royalty, one based on an analysis of comparable license rates, 
the other based on a top-down analysis of the total aggregate royalty that should be attributable to 
the standards and SEPs at issue.  Both of these methods are discussed in greater detail 
below.  What is most refreshing about Birss, J.’s opinion, however, is the absence of any 
attempted application of the 15-factor Georgia-Pacific framework for “reasonable royalty” patent 
damages,37 which U.S. courts feel compelled to apply despite the fact that a FRAND royalty 
calculation is not a remedial damages calculation.38  Without the baggage of Georgia-Pacific to 
clutter the analytical exercise, Birss, J. can focus on the actual task at hand: computing the value 
of the patented technology as compared to the standard and product at issue. 
  
            1.         No ex ante valuation.  In addition to disregarding the U.S. Georgia-
Pacific framework, which clearly has no place in a UK decision, Birss, J. rejects another 
touchstone of U.S. FRAND analysis: the notion that a FRAND royalty should reflect the ex 
ante value of the patented technology, without considering any value attributable to the adoption 
of the technology in a standard. This theoretical construct, which has its basis in economic 
analysis, has been adopted by scholars,39 regulatory agencies40 and courts in the U.S.41 It has, 
however, come under increasing criticism by commentators who advocate ceding at least part of 
the value of standardization to the SEP holder.42 In rejecting the ex ante valuation approach Birss, 
J. acknowledges that he is departing from the decisions of U.S. courts in cases such 
as Innovatio and Ericsson v. D-Link.43  In the end, however, he notes that the point is moot, as 
neither party pressed to use this approach. 
                                                      
37 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and 
aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
38 See Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and other Reasonable 
Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451 (2015) (criticizing use of Georgia-Pacific framework for FRAND 
royalty analysis). 
39 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 
(2007); Joseph Farrell, et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 603 (2007). 
40 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES 
WITH COMPETITION 22-23 (2011) (“A definition of RAND based on the ex ante value of the patented 
technology at the time the standard is chosen is necessary for consumers to benefit from competition 
among technologies to be incorporated into the standard”). 
41 Ericsson v. D-Link, 773 F.3d at 1232. 
42 See, e.g., Norman Siebrasse and Thomas F. Cotter, The Value of the Standard, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 1159 
(2017); J. Gregory Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses after Ericsson v. 
D-Link, __ U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming). 
43 Unwired Planet at ¶97. 
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            2.         Comparables Method.  Like many U.S. judges, Birss, J. relies heavily on 
comparable license agreements to determine a FRAND royalty.  While the use of comparable 
licenses has been criticized on the basis that most licenses are not really comparable to the desired 
FRAND license,44 the fact that Unwired Planet obtained each of the asserted patents from 
Ericsson was convincing proof that at least Ericsson’s licenses were comparable to whatever 
Unwired Planet would have negotiated with Huawei.45  Indeed, Birss, J. found that most other 
licenses (i.e., not involving Ericsson) proffered by the parties were not suitable comparables.  
  
            After identifying a suitable set of comparable Ericsson licenses, Birss, J. reasoned that the 
appropriate FRAND royalty rate for Unwired Planet’s 2G/3G/4G SEP portfolio should be the rate 
charged by Ericsson for its 2G/3G/4G SEP portfolio, multiplied by a factor representing the 
relative strength of Unwired Planet’s portfolio to Ericsson’s.46  Using these inputs, he calculates 
the FRAND rates for Unwired Planet’s portfolio as follows:47 
  
            a) 4G/LTE: 0.062% for handsets, and 0.072% for infrastructure;  
            b) 3G/UMTS: 0.032% for handsets, and 0.016% for infrastructure;  
            c) 2G/GSM: 0.064% for handsets, and 0.064% for infrastructure. 
  
            While this calculation results (as shown below) in a FRAND rate that is validated through 
other methods, it is questionable whether this methodology (which is dependent on having a 
comparable license under which the asserted SEPs were previously licensed) has significant 
applicability to other cases.  That is, FRAND rates in cases such as Microsoft v. 
Motorola and Ericsson v. D-Link could not have been calculated as simply or reliably as the rate 
in Unwired Planet because there did not exist an original SEP owner that sold a subset of its 
SEPs to the licensor in the case.  Thus, the straightforward apportionment of a fraction of the 
overall Ericsson portfolio to Unwired Planet would not have worked when Motorola or Ericsson 
itself was the licensor.  As such, the court in Unwired Planet may simply have been the 
beneficiary of good luck in having at hand such a clear set of comparable licenses.  This being 
said, the individual circumstances of a case are always key to resolving it, and I have previously 
observed that similar good fortune (in the availability of patent pools covering the standards at 
issue) played a significant role in establishing patent pool values as comparables in Microsoft v. 
Motorola, another well-reasoned decision.48 
  
            3.         Top-Down Methodology. In addition to the comparables method described above, 
Birss, J. uses a second FRAND calculation methodology as a “cross-check” of the result obtained 
using the comparables methodology.49  This is a “top down” or “aggregate royalty burden” 
approach, in which the aggregate royalty attributable to a standard under all SEPs is computed 
and then allocated to the SEP holder in suit. This approach has been advocated by 
                                                      
44 See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Abuse of Patent Licenses, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 115 (2015).  But 
see Colleen Chien and Eric Schulman, Patent Semi-Comparables, _ TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. _ 
(forthcoming) (arguing that many license comparisons may be useful in patent royalty calculations, even if 
facts are not identical from transaction to transaction). 
45 Unwired Planet at ¶180. 
46 Unwired Planet at ¶807(4), (7). 
47 Unwired Planet at ¶807(8). 
48 See Jorge L. Contreras, So That’s What RAND Means? A Brief Report on the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in Microsoft v. Motorola, Patently-O blog, Apr. 27, 2013. 
49 Unwired Planet at ¶476. 
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commentators50 and has been attempted in cases including Innovatio,51 as well as the Japanese IP 
High Court’s decision in Apple Japan v. Samsung.52 
  
            Under the top down method defined by Birss, J., the FRAND royalty equals T x S, 
where T is the total aggregate SEP royalty burden of a particular standard on a product (i.e., the 
percentage of a smartphone’s price that should be charged for all patents covering 4G), and S is 
the share of that aggregate royalty that is allocable to the SEP holder (Unwired Planet).53  To 
calculate “T”, Birss, J. considered public statements made by Ericsson and other holders of SEPs 
covering the relevant standards.54  He then calculated “S”, Unwired Planet’s share of the relevant 
SEPs, using a variety of counting and filtering methodologies proposed by the parties’ experts, 
including a filter for the likely essentiality of the patents in the asserted portfolio.55  The resulting 
FRAND rates served as validating cross-checks for the rates obtained using 
the Comparables methodology. 
             
F.         Injunctive Relief 
 
 The court concludes with a brief discussion of the injunctive relief requested by Unwired 
Planet: “Since Unwired Planet have established that Huawei have infringed valid patents … and 
since Huawei have not been prepared to take a licence on the terms I have found to be FRAND, 
and since Unwired Planet are not in breach of competition law, a final injunction to restrain 
infringement of these two patents by Huawei should be granted”.56Accordingly, Birss, J. ordered 
a hearing in “a few weeks’ time” to determine whether, by then, Huawei had entered into a 
license agreement with Unwired Planet at the rates he specified and, if not, to consider, and likely 




            In Unwired Planet v. Huawei, Birss, J. adopts a balanced and well-reasoned approach to 
determining FRAND royalties and assessing the parties’ contractual and competition law 
obligations in the face of FRAND commitments.  In doing so, he takes several important 
theoretical stands, which could have significant implications for the manner in which such cases 
are decided and how parties interact during FRAND negotiations.  Specifically, Birss, J. holds 
that there is but a single FRAND royalty rate applicable to any given set of SEPs and 
circumstances, but does not fault the parties for failing to pinpoint that rate in their initial offers or 
negotiations.  Abuse of dominance under Section 102 TFEU, he reasons, does not occur under 
Huawei v. ZTE unless a SEP holder’s offer is significantly above the true FRAND 
rate.  Likewise, he rejects the idea of “hard-edged” non-discrimination, concluding that even if a 
SEP holder has granted another licensee a lower royalty rate, an implementer may not challenge 
its own FRAND license so long as the difference does not distort competition between the two 
licensees. While I do not necessarily agree with all of his conclusions, I applaud Birss, J.’s careful 
                                                      
50 See Jason R. Bartlett and Jorge L. Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND Royalties: Can Interpleader Save the 
Internet of Things, __ REV. LITIG. __ (2017, forthcoming). 
51 In re Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *83. 
52 Apple Japan Godo Kaisha v. Samsung Electronics Co., IP High Court of Japan (May 16, 2014).  See 
discussion in Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 50. 
53 Unwired Planet at ¶178. 
54 Unwired Planet at ¶¶264-272. For a discussion of the usefulness and enforcement of such public patent 
“pledges”, see Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note 7. 
55 Unwired Planet at ¶¶325 et seq. 
56 Unwired Planet at ¶807(18). 
CONTRERAS UNWIRED PLANET Page 9 
and balanced reasoning in Unwired Planet v. Huawei.  I expect that it will become an important 
touchstone for courts around the world as they wrestle with the complex issues that arise in 
FRAND royalty cases, especially as increasing numbers of SEPs are transferred to, and enforced 
by, patent assertion entities. 
  
 
 
